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Abstract—Current research on soft-biometrics showed that privacy-sensitive information can be deduced from biometric templates of
an individual. Since for many applications, these templates are expected to be used for recognition purposes only, this raises major
privacy issues. Previous works focused on supervised privacy-enhancing solutions that require privacy-sensitive information about
individuals and limit their application to the suppression of single and pre-defined attributes. Consequently, they do not take into
account attributes that are not considered in the training. In this work, we present Negative Face Recognition (NFR), a novel face
recognition approach that enhances the soft-biometric privacy on the template-level by representing face templates in a
complementary (negative) domain. While ordinary templates characterize facial properties of an individual, negative templates
describe facial properties that does not exist for this individual. This suppresses privacy-sensitive information from stored templates.
Experiments are conducted on two publicly available datasets captured under controlled and uncontrolled scenarios on three
privacy-sensitive attributes. The experiments demonstrate that our proposed approach reaches higher suppression rates than previous
work, while maintaining higher recognition performances as well. Unlike previous works, our approach does not require
privacy-sensitive labels and offers a more comprehensive privacy-protection not limited to pre-defined attributes.
Index Terms—Biometrics, Face recognition, Privacy, Privacy-enhancement, Soft-biometrics
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE face is one of the most used biometric modalities [1][2], because it is known as a unique biometric modality
and it does not require an active user-participation [3] [4].
A typical face recognition system contains feature represen-
tations (templates) for each individual enrolled. Comparing
two templates allows to verify a claimed identity or to iden-
tify an unknown subject [5]. However, recent work showed
that more information than just the person’s identity can
be deduced from these templates [6]. With the use of soft-
biometric estimators, information about gender, age, ethnic-
ity, sexual orientation or the health status can be obtained
[6] [7]. Since many applications do not permit to have access
to these information, this shows a major invasion of privacy.
In many systems, the stored data should be exclusively used
for recognition purposes [8] and extracting such information
without a person’s consent can be considered as a violation
of their privacy [9]. To prevent such function creep, privacy-
sensitive information should be either hidden or suppressed
in face templates.
Previous works proposed privacy-enhancing solutions
for this problem that are either (a) limited to the suppression
of single pre-defined attributes [10] [8] [11] or (b) only
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capable of a restricted suppression performance [12]. While
(b) only offers a restricted privacy-protection, solutions from
(a) are vulnerable to unconsidered function creep attacks.
In this work, we propose NFR, a novel unsupervised
face recognition approach that performs comparisons of
face templates in a complementary (negative) fashion. While
ordinary positive templates describes individuals how they
actually are, negative templates stores only random comple-
mentary information about the individual. This suppresses
privacy-sensitive information in the template and thus, pre-
vents function creep attackers from easily extracting these
information. In order to forecast and guarantee a certain
recognition performance, we provide a theoretical reason-
ing of our solution and further demonstrate its correctness
empirically.
Soft-biometric privacy is challenged by maintaining
a high recognition performance while achieving a high
suppression performance for privacy-sensitive attributes.
Therefore, we analyse both aspects on two publicly available
databases under controlled and uncontrolled circumstances.
The evaluation of the attribute suppression performance is
done on three soft-biometric attributes: gender, age, and
race. Unlike most of previous works, we design our experi-
ments in the context of a function creep attacker who knows
and adapts to the used privacy mechanism.
The experiments show that our proposed approach is
able to reach 2-4 times higher suppression rates than pre-
vious works under different attack mechanisms and at-
tributes, while maintaining significantly higher recognition
performances. In the uncontrolled scenario, our solution
fully retains the recognition performance while reaching
suppression rates of up to 36%.
The main contribution of this work is a privacy-
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enhancing solution that
i) works on the biometric template-level, since most bio-
metric representations are stored in templates rather
than images [13] [14];
ii) considers a more challenging attack scenario of an
attacker that adapts to the systems privacy mechanism;
iii) does not require privacy-sensitive labels about individ-
uals (unsupervised privacy-preservation); and thus,
iv) offers a more comprehensive privacy-protection which
is not limited to the suppression of pre-defined at-
tributes.
Additionally, the source code for our approach is available
at the following link1.
2 RELATED WORK
Recent years exposed a growing interest in privacy preser-
vation in biometrics and related fields. In the field of data
mining, a lot of work was done learning statistical database
properties while ensuring individual privacy [15]. This lead
to privacy-enhancing concepts such as k-anonymity [16], l-
diversity [17], t-closeness [18], and differential privacy [15].
In the context of biometrics, privacy enhancing technolo-
gies aim at assuring that biometric data collected from an
individual is only used for the specific purpose of the ap-
plication [11]. For face representations, privacy preservation
has been studied from two perspectives. Either it focuses
on preserving facial characteristics like gender, age, and ex-
pression while de-identifying face images [19] [20] [21] [22]
or it tries to prevent the estimation of these facial attributes
while maintaining the recognition ability [8] (soft-biometric
privacy). In the latter case, the solutions were based on
image fusion, perturbations, and adversarial networks.
In order to suppress the gender of a face image, Suo
et al. [23] proposed an approach that flips the estimated
gender by decomposing the face image and replacing the
facial components with similar parts of the opposite gender.
Othman and Ross presented an approach [11] with the same
goal. They proposed a face morphing methodology that
iteratively morphs two images and therefore, suppresses
gender information at different levels. However, this re-
sulted in morphed images with many artefacts.
In [24] and [25], adversarial images were created by
using a fast flipping attribute technique, showed that it
was able to fool their network in predicting binary facial
attributes. An incremental flipping approach was proposed
by Mirjalili et al. [8] with the use of perturbations. In
[26], imperceptible noise was used in order to suppress k
attributes at the same time. However, this noise is trained
to suppress attribute from only one specific neural network
classifier and consequently, does not generalize.
In [10] [27] [28], Mirjalili et al. proposed semi-adversarial
networks consisting of a convolutional autoencoder, a gen-
der classifier, and a face matcher. It enhances the soft-
biometric privacy on image level. The autoencoder perturbs
the input face image such that it minimizes gender classi-
fier performance while trying to preserve the performance
of the face matcher. Training this supervised approach
1. https://github.com/pterhoer/PrivacyPreservingFaceRecognition/
tree/master/unsupervised/negative face recognition
requires a large amount of data with the corresponding
privacy-sensitive information. However, the aim of privacy-
enhancing technologies is to prevent a collection of privacy-
sensitive attributes. Moreover, this approach is limited at
suppressing pre-defined attributes and thus, it is vulnerable
to unseen function creep attacks.
Since most biometric representations are stored in tem-
plates rather than images [13] [14], privacy-enhancing ap-
proaches on template-level are presented in [29], [12] and
[30]. These works further investigate the privacy perfor-
mance in a more critical and challenging context of a
function creep attacker that knows the systems privacy-
mechanism. While Terho¨rst et al. [29] proposed an incremen-
tal variable elimination approach to eliminate privacy-risk
features, Morales et al. [30] suppress attribute information
via a modified triplet loss. Both approaches aim at the
suppression of very specific attributes which increases the
risk of unseen attacks.
In [12], this problem was tackled by proposing an un-
supervised privacy-enhancing technique using similarity-
sensitive noise transformations on template-level. This
unsupervised privacy-enhancing approach offers a more
general privacy-protection not limited to a pre-defined
attribute. However, it struggles with achieving high
suppression-rates while maintaining a high recognition abil-
ity.
In this work, we present an unsupervised privacy-
enhancing face recognition approach working on template-
level. Using positive and negative template domains, it is
able to achieve high privacy-sensitive attribute suppression
rates in a more critical and challenging scenario of a func-
tion creep attacker that adapts his attacks to the systems
privacy mechanism. The achieved privacy-protection is, by
design, not limited to the suppression of single attributes
and further maintains a high recognition ability.
3 METHODOLOGY
Enhancing the soft-biometric privacy aims at preventing
function creep attackers from reliably estimating privacy-
risk characteristics. This problem is further challenged by
simultaneously maintaining a high recognition ability. To
solve these issues, we propose negative face recognition.
While in usual face recognition systems, the used templates
describes the properties of an individual, our negative tem-
plates only contain complementary information and thus,
describes properties that a person do not have. We store
only negative (reference) templates in a database and com-
paring it with positive (probe) templates by calculating their
dissimilarity. Due to the complementary nature of the com-
pared templates, a high dissimilarity indicates that the tem-
plates belong to the same subjects and vice versa. Since the
stored negative templates only contain some random com-
plementary information, it prevents function creep attackers
from successfully deducing privacy-sensitive information.
Further, it allows a more generalized soft-biometric privacy-
protection that is, unlike previous works, not limited to the
suppression of a pre-defined characteristic. It is further a
promissing candidate for template protection, as shown in
a similar approach [31] for iris. It provides noninvertability,
revocability, and nonlinkability, which are the key properties
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of template protection. However, the template protection
applicability is out of the scope of this work.
Since the idea of this work is to store only random
complementary information of an individual in the database
(in form of negative templates), the next section describes
the enrolment process. This is followed by a section of the
adapted verification process, because the template compar-
ison within our approach is dealing with complementary
template versions.
3.1 Enrolment phase
In the enrolment phase, given a face image I , the corre-
sponding face embedding x is extracted from I . Then, this
embedding is transformed in the negative domain resulting
in a negative template t− , which is stored in the database.
The generation of a negative template t− from a face em-
bedding x is done in three steps: First, the face embedding
x is enlarged to get a higher-dimensional version v. Second,
v is discretized to create a positive template t+, and third, a
negative template t− is generated from its positive comple-
ment by replacing each feature entry with a random value
that does not match the original entry.
3.1.1 Embedding enlargement
In the first step, the given face embedding x is trans-
formed to a higher-dimensional space while maintaining
its recognition ability. Therefore, a face recognition model,
called enlargement-network, is trained to take the used
face embedding x as an input and outputs the higher-
dimensional face embedding v of size L. The network and
its training is described in Section 4.4. The enlargement step
is necessary due to the fact that (a) the genuine/imposter
decision is based on the dissimilarity between a positive
and a negative template and (b) the negative template
generation is based on a randomized process. If a positive
and a negative template belong to different subjects, but
are of low dimensionality, there is a higher chance that the
negative template is very dissimilar from the positive one.
For increased dimensionalities, the positive and the negative
templates share more similar feature entries and thus, in-
creases the similarity. In terms of positive-negative template
comparison, a high similarity indicates an imposter compar-
ison. Consequently, high dimensional templates are needed
for negative face recognition to reduce the recognition errors
from the randomization process.
3.1.2 Embedding discretization
In the second step, the enlarged embedding v is feature-wise
discretized into k bins. The k bins were chosen beforehand
on the enlarged training data using a quantile strategy
that divides each feature range into k bins such that every
bin contains an approximately equal number of samples.
Following this binning ranges, each feature entry of v is
replaced with the value l ∈ K = {1 . . . , k} of its corre-
sponding bin. This results in a discretized positive template
t+ ∈ KL. Discrete features are required for the feature-wise
computation of complementary feature sets that is needed
in next step of the negative template generation.
3.1.3 Negative template generation
The third step replaces each feature entry of the positive
template t+ with a random value from the complemen-
tary feature set. This results in a negative template which
contains facial properties that the person does not possess
and thus, it is hard to estimate the soft-biometrics of that
individual. Given a positive template t+ ∈ KL, a negative
associated template t− is generated feature-wise. This is
done by replacing each feature entry of t+ with a randomly
chosen value from K that does not match the original
entry. To be precise, for each component i the negative
representation t(i)− ∈ K\{t(i)+ } is given by a randomly chosen
value from the complement set K \
{
t
(i)
+
}
. This results in
the negative template t−, which is stored in the gallery
database.
3.2 Verification phase
In the verification phase, a negative (reference) template
stored in the database is compared with a positive (probe)
template from a captured individual. In order to verify
a persons identity with our negative face recognition ap-
proach, (1) the positive probe template and the negative
reference template have to be allocated and (2) the templates
are compared against each other to determine a comparison
score. This comparison score is used to make a verification
decision.
3.2.1 Template allocation
Given an input face image from an individual, first, its
embeddings (Section 3.1.1) have to be computed and sec-
ond, discretized (Section 3.1.2) to obtain the positive (probe)
template t+. The negative (reference) template t− is loaded
from the database. The positive and the negative template
can then be compared.
3.2.2 Positive-negative template comparison
In order to compute a comparison score between the pos-
itive and the negative template t+ and t−, we utilize a
normalized hamming-like distance
NHD(t+, t−) = 1− 1|t+|
|t+|∑
i=1
δ
(
t
(i)
+ , t
(i)
−
)
. (1)
The delta function δ(a, b) returns 1 if a equals b and 0 other-
wise. The size of the templates is defined by |t+| = L. The
NHD measures the dissimilarity of t+ and t− and, due to
the complement nature of positive and negative templates,
it can be directly utilized as a comparison score. Since the
positive template defines properties of the corresponding
individual, while the negative template describes properties
that the individual does not contain, a larger (NHD) distance
represents a higher probability that the templates originate
from the same subject and vice versa.
3.3 Discussion about the gain of privacy
Our negative face recognition approach makes a face recog-
nition system less vulnerable to function creep attacks in
cases where attackers get access to the stored data. Since
only negative templates are stored, the information about
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an individual is limited to the deeply-encoded description
of complementary nature. This enables our solution to offer
a more comprehensive privacy-protection that is not limited
to single pre-defined attributes.
However, in the case of function creep attackers getting
access to multiple negative templates that were created from
the same positive templates, a statistical analysis might
enable a reconstruction of the positive template. Conse-
quently, in this special case, a reconstruction and thus,
a reliable privacy-sensitive attribute estimation might be
possible. To prevent this attack strategy, we recommend the
use of differently-trained enlargement-networks for differ-
ent databases. This prevents that the generation of negative
templates from the same positive template and thus, cir-
cumvent this statistical analysis-based attack strategy even
in the case of attackers getting access to multiple negative
face databases.
3.4 Theoretical foundation
Since our approach is based on a randomized process in
the template generation, we provide a statistical reasoning
for the negative-positive comparison performance. Given
a theoretical or empirical score distribution of genuine
and imposter scores, this allows to predict the negative
face recognition performance including the probabilities of
falsely rejected and falsely accepted subjects. Consequently,
optimal hyperparameters can be chosen, as well as large-
scale experiments can be simulated, without the computa-
tional costs for sophisticated experiments.
Given two positive templates tA+, t
B
+ ∈ KL with a dis-
tance of,
HD(tA+, t
B
+) =
|t+|∑
i=1
δ
(
t
(i)
+ , t
(i)
−
)
= D, (2)
then, the probability of this distance in the negative domain,
HD(tA−, t
B
+) = D
′ with D′ ∈ [L−D,L] (3)
follows a Bernoulli distribution and is given by,
Pr [D′|D] =
(
D
µ(D′)
)(
k − 2
k − 1
)µ(D′)(
1
k − 1
)D−µ(D′)
.
(4)
The Bernoulli distribution can be assumed, since only en-
tries of equal values contribute to the distance and the state
of this entries is given by a fixed probability. The number of
bins in this equation is described by k = |K| and µ(D′) is
given by
µ(D′) = D′ − (L−D) , (5)
the number of entries that have to be flipped to the same
entry in order to achieve the determined distance of D′−D.
Based on our negative template generation principle (Sec-
tion 3.1.3), colliding bin labels tA+ and t
B
+ in the positive
domain, will not collide in the negative domain and thus,
will contribute to the distance. In order to achieve a distance
of HD(tA−, t
B
+) = D
′ in the negative domain, µ(D′) bin labels
have to be flipped such that they will contribute to the
distance calculation. The probability for such a single flip
is given by k−2k−1 and thus, the collision probability is given
by 1k−1 .
Given two positive templates tA+, t
B
+ with a distance of
HD(tA+, t
B
+) = D, then Equation 4 gives the probability for
the two templates to have a hamming distance of D′ if one
of the templates is in the negative domain.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
4.1 Database
In order to evaluate and compare our approach under
both controlled and uncontrolled conditions, we conducted
experiments on the public available ColorFeret [32] and Adi-
ence [33] databases. ColorFeret [32] consists of 14,126 images
from 1,199 different individuals with different poses under
controlled conditions. A variety of face poses, facial expres-
sions, and lighting conditions are included in the dataset.
The Adience dataset [33] consists of 26,580 images from
over 2,284 different subjects under uncontrolled imaging
conditions. Adience contains additional information about
gender and age. ColorFeret also provides labels regarding
the subjects ethnicities. We choose these databases because
they were captured under controlled and uncontrolled con-
ditions and provide information of soft-biometric attributes
and information about the identities. This allows to deeply
investigate the privacy-enhancing technologies by analysing
the recognition performance, as well as the suppression
performance of privacy-sensitive attributes.
4.2 Evaluation metrics
Enhancing soft-biometric privacy describes a trade-off be-
tween the desired degradatioin of the attribute estimation
performance by function creep attackers and the desired
preservation the recognition ability. In this work, we report
our verification performances in terms of false non-match
rate (FNMR) at fixed false match rates (FMR). We also
report the equal error rate (EER), which equals the FMR
at the threshold where FMR = 1−FNMR. This acts as a
single-value indicator of the verification performance. In
order to evaluate the attribute suppression performance,
we report our results in terms of attribute classification
accuracy on balanced test labels and in terms of attribute
suppression rates. The suppression rate describes reduction
of the attribute-prediction accuracy of the templates without
privacy-enhancement in comparison to the original tem-
plates.
4.3 Basic face recognition model
The proposed negative face recognition approach builds
on arbitrary face embeddings. In this work, we utilize the
widely used FaceNet model2 [34], which was pretrained
on MS-Celeb-1M [35]. In order to extract an embedding
of a face image, the image is aligned, scaled, and cropped
as described in [36] and then passed into the model. The
output of this network is a 128-dimensional embedding. The
comparison of two such embeddings is performed using
cosine-similarity.
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Fig. 1: Enlargement-network and positive/negative tem-
plate generation: the enlargement-network structure is
shown without softmax layer. Given a face embedding
(FaceNet) a larger representation of this embedding is com-
puted. A positive template is created by discretisation and
replacing each feature entry with an item its complementary
set, a negative template is generated.
4.4 Enlargement-network training
Our approach requires high-dimensional face embeddings,
in order to create discriminative negative templates. As
described in Section 3.1.1, an enlargement-network is used
to expand the low-dimensional face embeddings to size L.
This network has an input size of 128, corresponding to the
used face embeddings, and an output size of L = 4096.
It consists of three layers with 256, 512, and 4096 neurons,
and is shown in Figure 1. The first layers are activated by a
ReLU function, while the forth layer holds a tanh activation,
such that the output-features are within the range of [−1, 1].
To train the network, a softmax layer is added to classify the
identities in the test set with a binary cross-entropy loss. The
training is done with an AdaDelta optimizer (learning rate
lr = 0.5) over 50 epochs of training. Dropout (p = 0.5) [37]
and Batchnormalization [38] is applied on every layer. After
the training the softmax layer is removed.
4.5 Function creep attacks
For the evaluation of the attribute suppression, we simu-
late the critical scenario of a function creep attacker that
adapts to the systems privacy mechanism. The adaptation
step is done by training (function creep) classifiers on the
transformed (normalized and scaled) templates to predict
the privacy-sensitive attributes. These classifiers include
random forest (RF), support vector machines (SVM), k-
nearest neighbors (kNN), and logistic regression (LogReg).
The hyperparameters of these classifiers are fine-tuned with
Bayesian optimization.
4.6 Baseline approaches
In Section 2, we mentioned that many privacy-enhancing
methods were proposed that manipulate the face images it-
self using supervised approaches. However, most biometric
2. https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
systems store face templates instead of images [13] [14] and
furthermore, supervised approaches are vulnerable to at-
tacks on attributes that were unconsidered during training.
Therefore we proposed an unsupervised privacy-enhancing
approach working on template-level and compare it against
two state-of-the-art solutions with the same working prin-
ciples. In this work, we use similarity-sensitive noise trans-
formations [12] as baselines. More precisely, we compare
our proposed NFR approach against cosine-sensitive noise
(CSN) and euclidean-sensitive noise (ESN).
We calibrate the hyperparameters of these baselines in
such a way that they reach similar verification EER perfor-
mances. By doing so it is possible to fairly compare these
methods in terms of suppression rates. For all experiment
scenarios, subject-disjoint 5-fold cross-validation is utilized.
The performance over all folds is reported as the average
performance and its standard deviation.
4.7 Investigations
The investigations of this work are divided in five parts:
1. We show the need for a privacy-enhancing technology
by demonstrating that there is a significant leakage of
privacy-sensitive information from face templates on
both databases.
2. We analyse the face verification performance of our
privacy-enhancing solution to check to which degree the
recognition ability is maintained and compare it with
previous works.
3. We investigate the attribute suppression performance of
our solution and the baselines in the critical scenario of a
function creep attacker that adapts to the systems privacy
mechanism. This evaluates the soft-biometric privacy
protection.
4. We analyse the parameter space of our solution to pro-
vide a deeper understanding of our solution.
5. Lastly, we provide a empirical validation of the theoreti-
cal reasoning and validate its correctness.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Analysis of the function creep performance
Table 1 shows the attribute prediction performance of three
privacy-sensitive attributes in a scenario without privacy-
preservation. The performance of four function creep clas-
sifiers is shown under controlled (ColorFeret) and un-
controlled (Adience) circumstances using the original and
positive embeddings. Especially gender and race can be
determined with very high accuracies. This holds true for
the original embeddings as well as the (high dimensional
and discrete) positive embeddings. The table demonstrates
that there is a significant information leakage of privacy-
sensitive information from face templates and thus, a great
need for privacy-enhancing technologies.
5.2 Face verification performance
In Table 2 and 3, the recognition performance of the baseline
approach is shown in comparison to state-of-the-art [12] and
our approach. In order to make a fair comparison of the
attribute suppression analysis, the hyperparameters of both
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TABLE 1: Attribute prediction performance on original and positive templates (without privacy-enhancement). The
prediction accuracies of four function creep estimators are shown on two databases. A function creep attacker would
be able to predict the soft-biometric attributes with high accuracies demonstrating the need for privacy-enhancement.
Representation Dataset Attribute RF SVM kNN LogReg
Original ColorFeret Gender 93.37% ± 1.22% 96.61% ± 1.02% 97.30% ± 0.39% 95.74% ± 1.14%
Age 49.17% ± 2.40% 57.40% ± 2.63% 47.71% ± 2.06% 57.12% ± 2.91%
Race 82.21% ± 1.07% 88.73% ± 1.17% 85.10% ± 2.58% 88.03% ± 1.46%
Adience Gender 82.78% ± 1.79% 84.16% ± 2.34% 84.91% ± 2.45 82.43% ± 2.78%
Age 53.27% ± 4.08% 60.36% ± 4.10% 51.31% ± 3.08% 58.26% ± 4.93%
Positive (b=3) Colorferet Gender 90.05% ± 2.08% 96.92% ± 0.86% 94.89% ± 0.69% 93.45% ± 0.86%
Age 44.47% ± 2.78% 53.51% ± 1.69% 45.99% ± 1.69% 46.95% ± 1.19%
Race 79.73% ± 0.84% 87.52% ± 1.59% 84.09% ± 2.33% 84.46% ± 1.92%
Adience Gender 77.73% ± 1.82% 87.88% ± 2.72% 82.89% ± 2.64% 80.48% ± 2.62%
Age 48.48% ± 2.15% 59.51% ± 3.60% 48.90% ± 3.03% 49.06% ± 3.25%
Positive (b=4) Colorferet Gender 90.38% ± 2.51% 97.12% ± 0.59% 95.57% ± 0.62% 93.79% ± 0.72%
Age 45.46% ± 1.33% 54.54% ± 1.23% 47.29% ± 1.07% 48.20% ± 1.06%
Race 80.46% ± 0.88% 87.66% ± 1.82% 83.93% ± 2.05% 85.10% ± 1.53%
Adience Gender 76.71% ± 2.01% 87.38% ± 1.89% 82.95% ± 1.68% 79.43% ± 1.75%
Age 50.43% ± 2.62% 60.74% ± 2.86% 51.10% ± 2.66% 51.70% ± 2.00%
TABLE 2: Face recognition performance on ColorFeret. The original face recognition performance is compared against
three privacy-enhancing approaches, our proposed negative face recognition approach, cosine-sensitive noise (CSN), and
euclidean-sensitive noise (ESN).
FNMR@10−2 FMR FNMR@10−3 FMR EER
Original 3.65% ± 0.95% 14.22% ± 3.49% 1.97% ± 0.21%
Ours (k = 3) 6.50% ± 1.10% 18.32% ± 4.23% 3.18% ± 0.20%
CSN (Θ = 0.80) 7.61% ± 1.01% 23.54% ± 4.42% 3.25% ± 0.19%
ESN (r = 0.75) 7.47% ± 1.12% 23.55% ± 3.93% 3.21% ± 0.25%
Ours (k = 4) 8.65% ± 1.22% 20.26% ± 2.81% 4.15% ± 0.40%
CSN (Θ = 0.73) 11.18% ± 1.24% 32.16% ± 5.03% 4.20% ± 0.23%
ESN (r = 0.93) 11.56% ± 0.99% 33.01% ± 4.54% 4.24% ± 0.19%
unsupervised state-of-the-art approaches, CSN and ESN, are
calibrated such that it matches the EER of our approach
for k = 3 and k = 4 bins. In Table 2, the recognition
performance is shown for the ColorFeret database. While
the EER of templates without privacy-enhancement is about
2%, our approach with k = 3 (k = 4) bins leads to an EER
around 3% (4%). Even if CSN and ESN are calibrated to have
a comparable EER, their FNMR for low FMR is significantly
higher than our approach. In Table 3, the recognition per-
formance is shown for the Adience database. It is observed
that the recognition performance for our approaches (k = 3
and k = 4) is very close to the original performance, while
the CSN and ESN show a strongly degraded performance.
While CSN and ESN are based on noise injections that
leads to a partial identity loss, our approach is based on
a complementary representations, which keeps the identity
information, but transforms it in an irreversible manner.
To get a more detailed look in the recognition perfor-
mances over a wider range of decision thresholds, Figure
2 shows ROC curves on both datasets. In Figure 2a, the
performance is shown under controlled face image capture
conditions, while in Figure 2b the same is shown under
uncontrolled conditions. In both cases, it can be observed
that recognition performance is very close to the perfor-
mance of the original representations, while the CSN and
ESN shows a strongly degraded performance. Especially
under uncontrolled conditions (Figure 2b) the performance
even surpasses the performance of the original representa-
tions by a small amount due to its error correction ability.
This demonstrates, in contrast to previous work, that our
solution is able to maintains identity information to a large
degree.
5.3 Privacy-sensitive attribute suppression
In order to compare the soft-biometrics privacy-
enhancement, Table 4 shows the suppression rates for four
classifiers on three privacy-sensitive attributes. The attribute
suppression performances of our approach is shown and
compared with state-of-the-art approaches (CSN, ESB) [12]
calibrated to the same verification EER. In [12], CSN showed
significantly better performance than ESN, especially in
suppressing attribute prediction performance for SVM and
LogReg. However, CSN transforms each feature vector
to a random length r ∈ [1, 100], which makes it hard
to handle for classifiers such as SVM and LogReg. This
is not the case in our experiments, since we simulated
a committed function creep attacker that does not only
train on transformed data, but also rescales the feature
vectors to unit-length. This prevents classifiers, such as
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TABLE 3: Face recognition performance on Adience. The original face recognition performance is compared against
three privacy-enhancing approaches, our proposed negative face recognition approach, cosine-sensitive noise (CSN), and
euclidean-sensitive noise (ESN).
FNMR@10−2 FMR FNMR@10−3 FMR EER
Original 13.68% ± 5.24% 45.71% ± 6.88% 3.83% ± 0.72%
Ours (k = 3) 13.42% ± 4.79% 43.14% ± 9.14% 4.43% ± 0.80%
CSN (Θ = 0.84) 19.36% ± 6.30% 59.04% ± 6.90% 4.48% ± 0.75%
ESN (r = 0.62) 18.60% ± 5.76% 57.56% ± 6.59% 4.49% ± 0.72%
Ours (k = 4) 16.35% ± 4.20% 47.93% ± 8.69% 5.44% ± 0.78%
CSN (Θ = 0.74) 28.29% ± 7.49% 71.79% ± 6.59% 5.57% ± 0.80%
ESN (r = 0.88) 28.16% ± 6.91% 71.27% ± 5.73% 5.49% ± 0.70%
(a) ColorFeret (b) Adience
Fig. 2: Face recognition performance comparing the performance of the original templates, our approach and related work.
Our solution is able to maintain the verification performance to a higher degree then previous works.
SVM and LogReg, from unstable estimations. On both
databases, our solution achieves relatively high suppression
rates on all classifiers and all attributes. Generally, our
privacy-enhancement approach leads to 2-4 times higher
suppression rates compared to previous work under
different attack mechanisms and attributes.
5.4 Investigation of the parameter space
In the following, the parameter space is analysed to in-
crease the understanding of our solutions behaviour. More
precisely, the two parameters of our solution, the template
size L and the number of bins k, are varied and for every
parameter combination the face verification performance (in
terms of EER) and the attribute prediction performance from
different function creep estimators are shown. Figure 3 and
4 show the results for k = 3, 4 on ColorFeret. Figure 5 and
6 show the same on Adience. In these Figures the number
of bins k and the embedding sizes L are analysed in the
ranges of k = [3, 4] and L = [64, 4096]. All these scenarios
show that a bigger embedding size L leads to a lower face
verification error. This observation agrees with the nature
of positive-negative template comparisons. Higher dimen-
sional templates reduces the effect of random collisions for
the positive-negative template comparison. In lower dimen-
sions, a random collision for an imposter comparison has
a high impact on the resulting comparison score. Towards
the bin sizes k, it can be observed that k = 3 has a lower
face verification error than k = 4, but also higher predic-
tion accuracies from all function creep estimators. Higher
k leads to more variabilities, which affects verification as
well as the estimation of privacy-sensitive attributes. These
observations hold for both datasets and all function creep
estimators. Consequently, parameter k and L have to be
chosen to accomplish the desired trade-off between attribute
suppression and verification performance.
5.5 Theoretical Reasoning Analysis
In Section 3.4, a theoretical reasoning for our negative face
recognition approach was developed. Here, we want to
proof its correctness by empirically predicting the score
distributions of our approach and comparing it with the
achieved scores distributions. For each comparison score
in the positive domain, Equation 4 is used to calculate
the most probable score in the negative-positive domain.
Repeating this process with every score in the distribution
results in the score distributions in Figure 7. This figure
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TABLE 4: Attribute suppression performance on the ColorFeret and Adience databases. The gender, age, and race
suppression rates are shown for four function creep estimators. The highest suppression rates are highlighted.
Gender suppression rate Age suppression rate Race suppression rate
RF SVM kNN LogReg RF SVM kNN LogReg RF SVM kNN LogReg
C
ol
or
Fe
re
t
Ours (k = 3) 22.2% 4.5% 5.5% 6.9% 30.2% 11.1% 9.3% 26.1% 14.6% 4.1% 4.1% 7.8%
CSN (Θ = 0.80) 7.3% 3.6% 1.5% 4.1% 10.6% 6.0% 2.4% 6.7% 6.1% 2.3% 0.8% 2.5%
ESN (r = 0.75) 7.8% 3.8% 1.6% 3.9% 9.7% 5.9% 1.2% 7.4% 5.9% 2.3% 0.4% 2.8%
Ours (k = 4) 28.4% 7.4% 14.4% 10.9% 34.2% 13.7% 9.4% 31.2% 21.8% 7.6% 9.3% 12.0%
CSN (Θ = 0.73) 11.0% 5.0% 2.6% 5.3% 12.1% 8.6% 4.2% 9.6% 8.5% 3.7% 1.6% 4.3%
ESN (r = 0.93) 10.3% 5.4% 3.5% 5.8% 13.5% 8.1% 4.8% 8.8% 8.7% 3.6% 2.6% 4.0%
A
di
en
ce
Ours (k = 3) 26.1% 4.3% 6.8% 12.3% 28.7% 10.3% 8.0% 25.4% - - - -
CSN (Θ = 0.84) 8.8% 2.8% 2.5% 4.9% 10.3% 4.9% 5.7% 5.8% - - - -
ESN (r = 0.62) 7.0% 4.3% 2.5% 5.2% 10.1% 4.6% 6.5% 5.0% - - - -
Ours (k = 4) 32.6% 11.0% 19.9% 18.0% 36.3% 14.1% 16.9% 29.8% - - - -
CSN (Θ = 0.74) 14.6% 6.2% 6.2% 7.6% 16.6% 9.1% 12.2% 9.8% - - - -
ESN (r = 0.88) 14.1% 7.2% 6.5% 7.7% 15.1% 8.3% 11.9% 8.4% - - - -
(a) Gender (b) Age (c) Race
Fig. 3: On ColorFeret the face verification EER and the attribute estimation performances of function creep estimators are
shown for different embedding sizes and a fixed bin size of k = 3. The estimation performance is analysed for the attributes
gender, age, and race.
(a) Gender (b) Age (c) Race
Fig. 4: On ColorFeret the face verification EER and the attribute estimation performances of function creep estimators are
shown for different embedding sizes and a fixed bin size of k = 4. The estimation performance is analysed for the attributes
gender, age, and race.
shows the genuine and imposter scores distributions of our
proposed approached with k = 3, as well as its theoretically
predicted distribution. It can be seen that on both databases,
the predicted distributions accurately correspond to the
empirical score distributions. This validates our theoretical
considerations from Section 3.4.
6 CONCLUSION
Face biometric systems extract and store face templates dur-
ing enrolment to enable the recognition of individuals dur-
ing deployment. However, privacy-sensitive information
can be obtained from these templates. Since many applica-
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(a) Gender (b) Age
Fig. 5: On Adience the face verification EER and the attribute estimation performances of function creep estimators are
shown for different embedding sizes and a fixed bin size of k = 3. The estimation performance is analysed for the attributes
gender and age.
(a) Gender (b) Age
Fig. 6: On Adience the face verification EER and the attribute estimation performances of function creep estimators are
shown for different embedding sizes and a fixed bin size of k = 4. The estimation performance is analysed for the attributes
gender and age.
tions are expected to be used for recognition purposes only,
this raises major privacy issues. Previous work proposed su-
pervised privacy-enhancing solutions that require training
data with privacy-sensitive annotations, and thus, will only
be able to suppress the attributes included in the training.
Moreover, these supervised solutions limit their application
towards the suppression of a single attribute, increasing
the risk towards function creep attacks on unconsidered
attributes. In this work, we successfully proposed negative
face recognition, a privacy-enhancing solution working on
the template-level. It to prevents function creep attackers
from successfully predicting privacy-sensitive information
from stored face templates. Our novel solution is based
on the comparison of positive probe templates with nega-
tive reference templates. While positive templates contain
the facial properties of an individual, negative templates
contain random complementary information, i.e. properties
that the face do not have. Since only negative templates are
stored in the database, a reliable function creep estimation of
privacy-sensitive information is prevented. To guarantee a
certain recognition performance, we further provided a the-
oretical foundation of our solution and proved its correct-
ness empirically. The experiments were conducted on two
publicly available databases and on three privacy-sensitive
attributes. In the experiments, we simulated function creep
attackers that know about the systems privacy mechanism
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(a) ColorFeret (b) Adience
Fig. 7: Validation of the theoretical reasoning: score distribution of the empirical data versus the theoretical predictions.
The distributions show the genuine and imposter scores for k = 3 bins. The theoretical score predictions are done with
Equation 4 on the positive score distributions. The theoretical predictions accurately matches the experimental scores.
and adapt their attacks based on it. The experiments demon-
strated the effectiveness of our approach under both, con-
trolled and uncontrolled image capturing conditions. Our
proposed unsupervised solution significantly outperforms
comparable approaches from previous work, while main-
taining a significantly higher recognition performance. In
the uncontrolled scenario, negative face recognition fully
retains the recognition performance while achieving sup-
pression rates of up to 36%. Our solution is characterized
by the fact that it prevents the accumulation of privacy-
sensitive information during the training and offers more
comprehensive privacy-protection. Unlike previous work,
negative face recognition is not limited to the suppression
of single attributes.
Future work may investigate the proposed solution for
the task of template protection, since our solution intrinsi-
cally provides its key properties: noninvertability, revocabil-
ity, and nonlinkability.
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